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Work health and safety and the criminal law in Australia 
Richard Johnstone 
Abstract 
This article analyses recent Australian debates about the use of the criminal law in work health 
and safety regulation. It argues that these debates have to be seen in the context of the historical 
development of work health and safety regulation in the United Kingdom and Australia. The 
first part of the paper shows that since the late nineteenth century contraventions against the 
Australian work health and safety statutes have not been regarded as ‘really criminal’, and have 
largely been addressed by informal measures, and since the 1980s, by administrative sanctions. 
When prosecutions have taken place, work health and safety issues have been individualised and 
decontextualised, so that defendants have been able to reduce their culpability in the eyes of the 
court. Significant legal barriers have undermined the use of the crime of gross negligence 
manslaughter against corporations and individuals. The second part of the paper analyses recent 
debates about restructuring gross negligence manslaughter and bolstering the ‘criminality’ of 
offences under the work health and safety statutes. It argues that the latter debate has been 
constrained by the historical forces examined in the first part of the paper, and that the current 
position, embodied in the recently harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts, favours attempting 
to boost the criminality of the work health and safety legislation. The debate about reforming 
gross negligence manslaughter has stalled. 
Introduction 
Since late 2011 the Australian Commonwealth, states and territories have gradually been 
adopting a model Work Health and Safety Act endorsed by Australia’s Workplace Relations 
Ministers Council in 2009. This harmonisation of work health and safety law is the latest episode 
in 170 years of policy debate over the form and content of work health and safety regulation in 
Australia. In this article I analyse the way in which the Australian debate over the past 25 years 
about the use of the criminal law in work health and safety has been shaped by deep-rooted 
historical processes, including the complexities surrounding the ambiguous form of the criminal 
law underpinning the work health and safety legislation.  
Legislation regulating work health and safety in Australia dates back to 1854 for mining, when 
the colony of New South Wales enacted a short statute to regulate the inspection of coal mines, 
and to 1873 for industry generally, when Victoria enacted a Supervision of Workrooms and Factories 
Statute. Other colonies and, after Federation in 1901, states enacted their own work health and 
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safety legislation, essentially adopting the UK Factories Acts of the time: Victoria in 1885; South 
Australia in 1894; New South Wales in 1896; Queensland in 1896; Western Australia in 1904; 
and Tasmania in 1910. These early work health and safety statutes, drawing heavily on the UK 
work health and safety regulatory models of the day, included sanctions for contraventions of 
some of the provisions in the statute, usually in the form of prosecution, potentially resulting in a 
pecuniary fine. 
In this article I analyse the use of the criminal law in Australian work health and safety regulation 
and discuss recent policy debates aimed at strengthening the use of the criminal law in work 
health and safety enforcement, and reforming gross negligence manslaughter. A key aspect of my 
analysis is that current debates are strongly shaped by historical processes.  
First, I argue that from the outset, and following the UK pattern, the mainstream work health 
and safety statutes have been ‘decriminalised’, in that work health and safety inspectorates have 
preferred to resort to informal approaches to enforcement (principally through advice and 
persuasion), and have initiated criminal prosecutions largely as a last resort. There has also been a 
strong tendency to regard the sanctions in the work health and safety statutes as not being ‘really 
criminal’. This has been reinforced by a trend to prosecute mainly in response to incidents 
resulting in death or serious injury, so that offences have been ‘individualised’ and 
‘decontextualised’ in a way that has enabled employers to reduce their culpability. I also suggest 
that work health and safety has been decriminalised in a second sense, in that the mainstream 
criminal law is generally not used to punish employers and managers highly culpable for 
workplace death and serious injury. 
Second, I argue that these historical processes have framed and constrained recent attempts to 
bolster the criminality of work health and safety offences, and to reform the mainstream criminal 
law to facilitate manslaughter prosecutions where work-related deaths occur. I outline key 
features of the recent debate about the use of the criminal law in work health and safety 
regulation in Australia. From the late 1980s this debate has had three foci. The first is on the 
possibility of making it easier to prosecute individuals, corporate employers and corporate 
officers for manslaughter under the mainstream criminal law. The second is on attempting to 
‘recriminalise’ offences in the work health and safety statutes by increasing pecuniary penalties 
(fines). The third focus is on enhancing the ‘criminality’ of the work health and safety statutes 
themselves by creating new offences where contraventions of general duty provisions of the 
work health and safety statutes result in serious injury or death and/or involve criminal 
negligence or recklessness; and in introducing non-pecuniary penalties. I conclude that the latter 
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two approaches have clearly prevailed, and have been institutionalised in the harmonised Work 
Health and Safety Acts. 
The Decriminalisation of work health and safety offences in Australia 
Hostages to History’ 
Historians have ably documented how, from the 1840s, the UK factory inspectorate’s approach 
to enforcement focused on securing compliance through advice, persuasion and negotiation, 
rather than on prosecuting contraventions: prosecutions were used as a last resort, and reserved 
for ‘serious’ or ‘wilful’ offences. Carson1 has shown that this approach to enforcement was the 
inspectorate’s way of responding to, and mediating, the conflicting social forces it faced at the 
time. On the one hand there was strong support for ‘effective regulation’, not just from social 
movements agitating for better working conditions (such as the so-called Ten Hours Movement 
and its Shorter Time Committees) but also from upper- and middle-class philanthropists, and 
from large, urban manufacturers who had, for various reasons, had voluntarily improved factory 
conditions, and wanted to prevent being undercut by less scrupulous smaller employers and rural 
employers. On the other hand the inspectors discovered that contravention of the Factory Acts 
was widespread, even among ‘respectable’ employers, and heavy use of prosecution would have 
resulted in the ‘collective criminalisation’ of highly influential employers. The adoption of the 
‘advise and persuade’ approach to enforcement institutionalised the ‘ambiguity’ of factory crime, 
so that despite it having the features of criminal law, it was not regarded as ‘really criminal’;2 and 
frequently breached and substantially tolerated in practice (that is, ‘conventionalised’) (1979, 38). 
These tendencies were reinforced by the fact that from 1844 the Factories Acts generally 
imposed strict liability (that is, did not require proof of intention to offend, or reckless or 
criminal negligence), and that health and safety offences have always largely been ‘inchoate’ (that 
is, contraventions can occur from unsafe conditions, even if no injury results). As Tombs and 
Whyte point out, both of these factors – strict or absolute liability, and the inchoate nature of 
work health and safety offences – further differentiate offences in the work health and safety 
statutes from ‘real’ crimes of violence in the mainstream criminal law.3 
Despite the fact that this differentiation of work health and safety crime from ‘real’ crime was 
socially constructed under particular historical circumstances, it was taken up elsewhere and has 
been widely accepted by researchers, regulators, lawyers and the community. It is clear that the 
early Australian inspectorates immediately adopted the advise and persuade approach to work 
health and safety enforcement. For example, the Queensland inspectorate in 1896 sought to 
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‘secure compliance with the provisions of the Act … without having to recommend stronger 
measures than persuasion’.4 In 1985, reflecting on his experience as Chief Inspector in Victoria 
from 1962 to 1973, Paul Prior5 suggested that 
Most inspectorates … see as a failure any inspector who constantly has to launch 
prosecutions in order to obtain compliance. They see the legislation they administer as 
being remedial rather than punitive in nature, i.e. they are there to improve the 
conditions of work, not to make the employer or employee suffer penalties for breaches 
of the law. ... 
Contemporary Australian work health and safety enforcement statistics show just how deeply 
entrenched this approach to enforcement is. Prosecution plays a very small part in the 
enforcement profiles of the current Australian work health and safety inspectorates. For 
example, the latest enforcement data across all Australian jurisdictions shows that in 2010–11 
there were 79 290 ‘proactive’ workplace visits and 61 588 ‘reactive’ workplace visits by inspectors 
in all jurisdictions around Australia.6 During these just over 140,000 visits, 1101 inspectors issued 
57 611 improvement, prohibition and infringement notices and completed 397 prosecutions, 
resulting in total fines of $15.5 million (an average fine of just over $39,000).7 These data suggest 
that most enforcement action involves informal advice and persuasion, and when statutory 
enforcement sanction s are used by inspectors, they are principally improvement notices (51 
349). The number of prosecutions across all jurisdictions has been decreasing in recent years. 
Individualisation and decontextualisation of offences during prosecution 
I argue that work health and safety offences are ‘decriminalised’ in another sense: when 
prosecutions are taken, they focus on an incident resulting in serious injury or death, and in the 
process of prosecution that event is individualised and decontextualized, so that employer 
culpability is reduced, indeed sometimes trivialised. This conclusion was drawn from a study of 
200 work health and safety prosecutions in Victoria in the Magistrates’ Court in the period 1986-
98.8 Even though the Australian work health and safety statutes Acts provide for inchoate 
offences, the vast majority of work health and safety prosecutions focus on an ‘event’. For 
example, in the Victorian study, 87% of prosecutions were taken after a serious injury or fatality 
had occurred.9 Once the prosecution is focused on the incident causing the injury or fatality, the 
incident is easily drawn out of, or ‘splintered’ from, its broader context - the underlying system 
of work, the defendant’s inadequate approach to systematic work health and safety management, 
production pressures and so on.10 One explanation for the low penalties imposed by courts for 
work health and safety offences (in the Victorian study the average fine was 20% of the 
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maximum penalty) has to do with the ease with which the defendant's representatives can use 
this event focus to decontextualise the offence and make it appear far less serious than it actually 
is when presenting arguments in mitigation of penalty. The defendant can focus the court’s 
attention on the minute details of the event and use a number of very common arguments to 
further isolate the event from its work health and safety context. For example, in the Victorian 
study defence counsel regularly: 
 attempted to ‘shift’ blame onto the injured or deceased worker, a fellow worker, the 
supplier of the plant involved in the incident, or an inspector who had previously 
inspected the workplace without drawing attention to the hazard; 
 argued that the defendant was a ‘good corporate citizen’, with an unblemished record 
and  good attitude to work health and safety – a submission that is very difficult to 
challenge because the prosecutor has a very limited role in the sentencing process, and 
usually had inadequate information about the defendant; 
 suggested that the event was a ‘freak accident’ or ‘one off’ event, in the sense that the 
exceptional, the unforeseeable and hence the unpreventable had occurred; and 
 tried to ‘isolate the event in the past’ by arguing that since the incident the defendant 
had introduced a new approach to managing health and safety, or a new management, so 
that the court had no cause to deter, rehabilitate or punish the defendant, because the 
wrong had been corrected.11   
 
Not only does this prosecution process trivialise work health and safety offences, and reduce the 
culpability of employers for providing unsafe working environments, but it also defuses work 
health and safety as an issue in capitalist economies: The court is seen to be dealing with work 
health and safety, and convicting offenders, but at the same time sanitising the issues so that 
work-related illness and injury are not seen as the result of poor work health and safety 
management and of unequal power structures, and so that the underlying activity, the production 
of goods and services, is not threatened. In other words, the court plays a major legitimating role 
in work health and safety, but the underlying issues are largely untouched. Of course, to maintain 
legitimacy, the law must appear to be just and effective, and the few prosecutions that do take 
place play an important role in legitimizing work health and safety regulatory regimes.12 
I also argue that this approach is embedded in the form of the criminal law – which traditionally 
has focused on ‘events’ committed by ‘individuals’ with ‘mens rea’. For the criminal justice 
process to be used effectively to prosecute work health and safety offences, criminal law and 
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procedure needs to be restructured to address crimes committed by organisations, where the 
egregious offence is a failure to take a systematic approach to work health and safety 
management in order to provide a working environment without work health and safety risks.13  
The Australian enforcement debate 
The renewed policy interest in work health and safety regulation in Australia has included a 
vibrant debate about enforcement, and ways of bolstering the sanctions in the work health and 
safety statutes. Since the late 1970s, each of the reformed Australian work health and safety 
statutes has provided work health and safety inspectors with the power to issue improvement 
and prohibition notices, and to launch prosecutions for contraventions of the work health and 
safety statutes. Prior to 2012, each of the Australian jurisdictions – apart from the 
Commonwealth, Victoria and Western Australia – had statutory provisions empowering 
inspectors to issue infringement notices (in South Australia, called an expiation notice) for at 
least some contraventions of the work health and safety statute. There were significant 
differences in the contraventions for which infringement notices (on-the-spot fines) could be 
issued, the persons to whom notices could be issued, and the amount of the fine (which ranged 
from $315 in South Australia to $1500 in New South Wales).14  
Another important development in most jurisdictions has been to enact provisions in the work 
health and safety statutes exposing senior officers in a corporation to criminal liability for failing 
to ensure that the corporation of which they were an officer complied with its work health and 
safety legal duties. Prior to 2012, most of the Australian work health and safety statutes 
attributed liability to directors and senior managers for the conduct of their company in certain 
circumstances. In some jurisdictions (Western Australia and Victoria prior to 2004) liability was 
accessorial, in the sense that officers were liable if the corporate offence was committed with 
their consent or connivance or was due to their neglect. In other jurisdictions, liability was 
‘imputed’ to senior officers. In New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, officers were 
deemed liable for the work health and safety offences of the corporation unless they could 
establish a defence that they were not in a position to influence the corporation (New South 
Wales and Queensland); that they had no knowledge of the offence (Tasmania); or that that they 
were in such a position (or had the requisite knowledge) but had exercised all due diligence to 
ensure that the corporation met its duties. In Victoria, South Australia and the two territories 
officers were made personally liable if the contravention of their company was attributable to the 
officer failing to take reasonable care. Only in Queensland and the Northern Territory could 
officers be imprisoned for contravening the officers’ duty. The possibility of imprisonment 
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certainly helps assert the criminality of the work health and safety statutes; but very low 
prosecution rates ‘conventionalised’ these offences.15 
From 2012, the jurisdictions adopting the model Work Health and Safety Act (as part of a 
process to harmonise work health and safety statutes)16 have enacted a positive and proactive 
duty requiring officers to exercise due diligence to ensure that the person conducting the 
business or undertaking complies with its duties and obligations under the Act. Where an officer 
is reckless and engages in conduct that exposes an individual to whom a duty is owed to a risk of 
death or serious injury or illness, the officer can be imprisoned for up to five years. 
Before 2012 five Australia  work health and safety statutes (the Commonwealth, Victoria, 
Queensland, Tasmania and the ACT) gave work health and safety inspectorates the power to 
accept enforceable undertakings ‘offered’ by an individual or firm allegedly in breach of the 
health and safety statute. The individual or firm makes a promise to the regulator to do or refrain 
from doing certain activities. If contravened, the undertaking is enforceable in court, often with 
additional penalties for the contravention of the undertaking.17 Enforceable undertakings are 
included in the harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts.  
Four other initiatives have been taken in recent years, to, in some way, address the issue of ‘the 
criminality’ of work health and safety contraventions. These include: 
 attempts at reforms to make it possible successfully to prosecute corporations and 
officers and/or senior managers for gross negligence manslaughter; 
 imposing higher levels of fines for contraventions of the work health and safety statutes; 
 creating new offences with additional elements: mens rea and/or serious injury/fatality; 
and 
 giving courts a wider range of sanctions (such as court-ordered publicity, modified 
community service orders; and corporate probation). 
The remainder of this paper will critically evaluate these four initiatives, and in particular will 
examine the way in which they address the historical process of decriminalising work health and 
safety offences.  
Manslaughter 
Earlier in this article, I argued that contraventions of work health and safety statutes have been 
‘decriminalised’ in two senses. There is, of course, a third and more obvious sense in which work 
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health and safety contraventions have been ‘decriminalised’, and that is in the failure of the 
‘mainstream’ criminal law to develop rules to ensure that corporations and corporate officers can 
be prosecuted for manslaughter when there is a fatality at work.  
From the mid-1980s, the revived Australian public policy interest in work health and safety 
regulation included a strong debate about the possibility of prosecuting corporations and senior 
officers responsible for workplace fatalities with charges of manslaughter and other mainstream 
criminal law crimes. The debate about possible ‘industrial manslaughter’ prosecutions was partly 
a response to some major incidents involving multiple work fatalities, for example the explosion 
in 1986 at the Laverton North (in the state of Victoria) foundry of Simsmetal Limited, which 
killed four workers and injured another seven. 
The crime most likely to be used to prosecute employers responsible for work-related deaths is 
manslaughter by gross or criminal negligence, which involves 
'a great falling short of the standard of care' which a reasonable person would have exercised, 
involving 'such high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act 
merited criminal punishment'.18 
Note that there is no reason why gross negligence manslaughter should only apply when an 
employee is killed as a result of an employer’s gross negligence – gross negligence manslaughter 
can be committed by an employer where its gross negligence causes the death of non-employees, 
including members of the public. 
 
To date, there have only been a few attempts at prosecuting firms or senior managers for 
manslaughter for workplace death, and I am only aware of three successful prosecutions. In 
Queensland in the 1990s in R v O’Connor a director of a small company was convicted and 
imprisoned for 18 months - other details of the case are difficult to come by. In 2008 the 
operator of a small business and an employee were convicted of manslaughter by criminal 
negligence, after both entered a guilty plea. The District Court of New South Wales considered 
that both parties had a low level of culpability, and sentenced the owner of the business to a two 
year suspended sentence, and the charge against the employee was dismissed without recording a 
conviction.19 
 
In principle, there is no reason why a corporation, corporate officer or manager could not be 
prosecuted under this existing law.20 To date, there has only been one successful Australian 
prosecution of a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter in 1994 in R v Denbo Pty Ltd,21 
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where a small company entered a guilty plea after a truck driver was killed when the truck’s 
brakes failed while taking a steep short cut on a construction site. The evidence suggested that 
one director knew the brakes were faulty and should have had them fixed or instructed the 
worker to take another route. 
Why are prosecutions for gross negligence manslaughter so rare? One explanation is that 
whenever there is a fatality at work, the police defer to the work health and safety inspectorate, 
who conduct investigations and prosecute, if at all, for contraventions of the relevant work 
health and safety statute. Work health and safety regulators are, however, aware of the possibility 
of referring the matter to the police or the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions for a 
manslaughter prosecution, but this is rarely done, because of the difficulties of proving that a 
corporation, or a corporate officer, committed the offence. 
Corporate manslaughter 
The major difficulty in launching manslaughter prosecutions against corporations is that 
Australian corporate criminal liability for manslaughter is based on direct liability, and ‘it must be 
shown that an act or omission was performed by someone with the authority to act as the 
corporation’.22 In corporate manslaughter cases, Australian courts have generally followed 
attribution principle set out in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass [1972] AC 153, where the House 
of Lords in effect held that the only persons whose state of mind and conduct can be attributed 
to the company are the board of directors, the managing director, or any other person to whom 
a function of the board has been fully delegated. Thus, in R v A C Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd 
(1995) 140 IR 243 Hampel J held (at 254) that neither the plant engineer nor the plant manager 
and safety co-ordinator, or the two employees who were alleged to have acted with gross 
negligence, ‘were acting as the Company’. Rather, their ‘acts were personal failures to act so as to 
give effect to the will of the company’. This principle has been heavily criticised as failing to 
reflect the principle of corporate blameworthiness, and being unworkable in the context of larger 
organisations.23 
There have been three attempts to reform this attribution principle in Australian law. The first is 
to be found in Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which has the potential significantly 
to alter the Australian law of corporate criminal responsibility.  
Section 12.3 provides that: 
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(1) If intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element in relation to a physical element of an 
offence, that fault element must be attributed to a body corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.  
Sub-section (2) provides further details of ‘the means by which such an authorisation or 
permission may be established’, which include: 
(a) proving that the body corporate's board of directors intentionally, knowingly or recklessly carried out 
the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the 
offence; or 
(b) proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
engaged in the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the 
commission of the offence; or 
(c) proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated 
or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision; or 
(d) proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required 
compliance with the relevant provision. 
‘Corporate culture’ is defined in section 12.3(6) as ‘... an attitude, policy, rule, course of 
conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body 
corporate in which the relevant activities takes place’.24  
Offences such as manslaughter by gross negligence are dealt with by section 12.4, which 
provides that: 
(2) If 
(a) negligence is a fault element in relation to a physical element of an offence; and 
(b) no individual employee, agent or officer of the body corporate has that fault element; 
that fault element may exist on the part of the body corporate if the body corporate's conduct is 
negligent when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating the conduct of any number of its 
employees, agents or officers). 
(3) Negligence may be evidenced by the fact that the prohibited conduct was substantially attributable to: 
(a) individual corporate management, control or supervision of the conduct of one or more of its 
employees, agents or officers; or 
(b) failure to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to relevant persons in the 
body corporate. 
In short, these provisions enable proof of gross negligence to be established by examining the 
combined conduct of employees, officers and agents, rather than just the conduct of a very 
senior officer.  
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In practice, however, this important reform has had virtually no impact, for two reasons. First, 
there is no crime of industrial manslaughter in the Commonwealth Crimes Act. Second, only one 
other Australian jurisdiction has enacted these Commonwealth provisions – the Australian 
Capital Territory, in sections 51 (fault elements other than negligence) and 52 (negligence) of 
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), but only for crimes enacted after 2002. The ACT government has, 
in fact, enacted a new crime of industrial manslaughter, and this will be examined later in this 
article. In a 2000 Discussion Paper, the Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney-General 
(2000) recommended that the Queensland Parliament adopt the Commonwealth Criminal Code 
Act provisions, but this proposal was shelved late in 2002.  
The second reform initiative was in Victoria, in the form of the Victorian Crimes (Workplace 
Deaths and Serious Injuries) Bill 2001, which also contained an aggregation principle, albeit in a 
slightly different form. It allowed for ‘the conduct of the body corporate as a whole to be 
considered’ (clause 14B(4)) and provided (see clause 14A(2)) that the conduct of an employee, 
agent or senior officer of a body corporate acting within the actual scope of their employment, 
or within the actual authority, ‘be attributed to the body corporate’. This meant that ‘the conduct 
of any number of employees, agents or senior officers of the body corporate may be aggregated’ 
(clause 14B(5)), except that the negligence of an agent ‘in the provision of services’ could be 
taken into consideration but may not be attributed to the corporation (clause 14B(5) (b)). 
Clause 14B(6) of the Victorian Bill then provided that the ‘negligence of a body corporate may 
be evidenced by the failure of the body corporate  
a)  adequately to manage, control or supervise the conduct of one or more of its employees, 
agents or senior officers; or 
b)  to engage as an agent a person reasonably capable of providing contracted services; or  
c)  to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to relevant persons in 
the body corporate; or  
d)  to take reasonable action to remedy a dangerous situation of which a senior officer has 
actual knowledge; or  
e)  to take reasonable action to remedy a dangerous situation identified in a written notice 
served on the body corporate by or under an Act.’ 
The Bill was innovative for another reason – it proposed two new crimes: ‘corporate 
manslaughter’ which involved ‘a corporate body which by negligence kills a worker in the course 
of the worker's employment’ (clause 13); and ‘negligently causing serious injury by a body 
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corporate’ (clause 14). For the purposes of these two offences, conduct is ‘negligent’ if it 
‘involves such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable body corporate 
would exercise in the circumstances and such a high risk of death or really serious injury [or high 
risk of serious injury] that the conduct merits criminal punishment’ (clauses 14B(1) and (2)). In 
determining whether a body corporate was negligent, ‘the relevant duty of care is that owed by a 
body corporate to the person killed or seriously injured’ (clause 14B(3)). In short, the elements of 
the corporate manslaughter offence codified the common law test for ‘gross negligence’ 
manslaughter. 
After strong public opposition, particularly from employers, the Bill was abandoned in 2002. 
Prosecuting corporate officers for manslaughter 
Two legal obstacles make it difficult for corporate officers to be prosecuted for manslaughter. 
The first is that to succeed in a manslaughter prosecution, the prosecutor must show that the 
director owed a ‘civil law duty of care’ to the deceased that was grossly breached, and that the 
breach caused the death; and the second is that the prosecutor must prove that an ‘act’ of the 
officer caused the death.25 
The first obstacle arises because in most cases it is the company (not an officer) that has a duty 
towards employees and others. In other words, in most cases the officer does not owe a civil law 
duty of care to employees – the officer’s duty is to the company. There are exceptions to this 
rule where the officer personally ‘procured, directed or authorised’ the company to commit the 
unlawful act in question which resulted in the harm; and where the officer had acted in such a 
way towards the deceased that the officer had ‘assumed’ a personal responsibility towards the 
injured person so as to create between them ‘a special relationship’.26 
The second obstacle arises because an omission or failure to act is not an ‘act’, and will not 
establish criminal liability for a death or serious bodily injury under common law, unless ‘the law 
imposes a duty to act’.27 In most cases where it is alleged that an officer should be liable for 
manslaughter the allegations tend to focus on an omission by the officer. 
Both the Victorian and Australian Capital Territory reforms discussed above also addressed 
manslaughter by officers. The Victorian Bill attempted to build the liability of ‘senior officers’ 
onto the corporate offences. Clauses 14C(1) and (2) provided that if it was proven that the body 
corporate committed the crimes of corporate manslaughter or of negligently causing serious 
injury, a senior officer of the body corporate could also be found liable for an indictable offence 
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(accessorial liability). These crimes would be committed if: (a)(i) the senior officer was 
‘organisationally responsible’ for the conduct, or part of the conduct, of the corporation in 
relation to the commission of the offence by the corporation (see also clauses 14D(3)(a)-(c)); (ii) 
in performing or failing to perform her or his organisational responsibilities, the officer 
‘contributed materially’ to the commission of the offence; (iii) the officer knew, as a consequence 
of her conduct, that there was a substantial risk that the body corporate would engage in conduct 
that involved a high risk of death or really serious injury; and (b) having regard to the 
circumstances known to the senior officer, it was unjustifiable to allow the substantial risk to 
exist. Senior officers acting without any fee, gain or reward could not be liable for these offences. 
Late in 2003 the Australian Capital Territory Parliament enacted the Crimes (Industrial 
Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) which created new offences of ‘industrial 
manslaughter’. Sections 49C and 49D provided that employers (defined very broadly and 
including government and corporate employers) and ‘senior officers’ (defined in s 49A) may be 
charged with the offence of industrial manslaughter if a ‘worker’ employed or engaged by the 
employer: 
(i) dies in the course of employment or while providing services to the employer; 
(ii) the employer or senior officer's conduct causes the death; and 
(iii) the employer or senior officer is 
(a) reckless about causing harm to the employer or any other worker of the employer; or 
(b) negligent about causing the death of the worker, or any other worker of the employer. 
‘Conduct’ is defined to include omissions to perform a duty to avoid or prevent danger to the 
life, safety or health of a worker if the danger arises from an act of the employer or officer, 
anything in the employer's or officer's possession or control, or any undertaking of the employer 
or officer.  
Note that employers and senior officers can only commit manslaughter under these provisions in 
relation to a ‘worker’, who is defined to include ‘employees’, ‘independent contractors’, 
employees of contractors or sub-contractors, ‘outworkers’, ‘apprentices’, ‘trainees’ and 
‘volunteers’. This excludes fatalities caused to members of the public and persons who are not 
covered by the broad definition of ‘worker’. 
The Act provides for substantial penalties where the offence of industrial manslaughter has been 
committed. The maximum penalty is A$200,000 and/or imprisonment for 20 years. The court 
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can order corporations to take actions including publicising the offence, notifying specified 
persons of the offence, or carrying out a specified project in the public interest, although the 
total cost to the defendant of carrying out these orders and paying fines cannot exceed 
A$5,000,000. 
Complexities 
At the end of 2012, despite much debate over the potential use of industrial manslaughter 
prosecutions in Australia, only in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has legislation been 
enacted to allow the acts of employees, officers and agents of a corporation to be aggregated to 
determine whether or not a corporation has been reckless or grossly or criminally negligent in 
causing the death of a worker, and to provide for the possibility of officers being prosecuted for 
recklessly or grossly negligently causing the death of a worker. The ACT is a very small 
jurisdiction, with just over 195,000 employees, a third of whom are employed in public 
administration. About a third are employed in professional, scientific and technical services, 
education and training, health care and social assistance. Most of the other employees are 
employed in retail and in other service industries. Just over 10 per cent of employees work in 
construction, manufacturing and transport, postal and warehousing. In other words, the ACT is 
not home to many dangerous occupations, although late in 2012 an Inquiry into safety in the 
ACT’s construction industry reported on the poor levels of compliance in that industry. 
There are other complex strands in the Australian manslaughter debate. Australian courts have 
repeatedly made it clear that the primary purpose of work health and safety prosecutions is 
deterrence – both general and specific. Some advocates of manslaughter prosecutions assume 
that these prosecutions will also have a deterrent effect, but respected commentators28 have 
argued that there is little evidence that manslaughter prosecutions will have a deterrent effect, 
and that manslaughter prosecutions should be used for symbolic purposes. Indeed, it would 
make more sense for regulators to see manslaughter prosecutions as retributive and symbolic, 
and primary concerned with reaffirming society’s abhorrence of work deaths. 
Other writers29 have argued that manslaughter prosecutions are complex because by focusing on 
a few particularly serious cases and singling them out for ‘special treatment’, the regulator risks 
further undermining the ‘criminality’ of work health and safety offences. In other words, unless 
their purpose is clear, the use of manslaughter prosecutions could be reinforcing that work 
health and safety prosecutions are not ‘really criminal’ because when there is a serious fatality, the 
‘real’ criminal law is used. 
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Digression: Harassment and Brodie’s Law 
In 2006 a young café employee, Brodie Panlock, jumped off a building to her death following 
persistent and systematic physical and emotional bullying at work. In 2010 WorkSafe Victoria 
brought a number of successful prosecutions under the general duty provisions of Occupational 
Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) against four employees (including managerial employees) 
working in the café. 
The case spawned a debate about the use of anti-stalking provisions in each of the Australian 
criminal codes, which proscribe behaviour calculated to harass, threaten or intimidate other 
persons. In 2012 the Victorian government enacted the Crimes Law Amendment Act 2011 (Vic) 
which amended s 21A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) to ensure that the crime of stalking (which 
could lead to imprisonment for up to 10 years) included:… 
(da) making threats to the victim; 
(db) using abusive or offensive words to or in the presence of the victim; 
(dc) performing abusive or offensive acts in the presence of the victim; 
(dd) directing abusive or offensive acts towards the victim; … 
(g) acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected -    
(i) to cause physical or mental harm to the victim, including self-harm; or    
(ii) to arouse apprehension or fear in the victim for his or her own safety or that of any other 
person- with the intention of causing physical or mental harm to the victim, including self-harm, 
or of arousing apprehension or fear in the victim for his or her own safety or that of any other 
person. 
In November 2012 a Commonwealth Parliamentary Inquiry into Workplace Bullying declined to 
recommend that a national equivalent of this legislation be enacted, and instead called for a 
national advisory service to assist employers and workers deal with the issue. 
Strengthening the criminality of the work health and safety offences 
Some writers argue that there is another way – apart from using the mainstream criminal law – of 
reasserting the criminality of work health and safety offences, and that is to take measures to 
reclaim and strengthen the criminality of contraventions of existing work health and safety 
statutes. 
 For example, in the debate about industrial manslaughter in the United Kingdom, Appleby30 
argued that rather than introduce new provisions for industrial manslaughter, work health and 
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safety would be better served if regulators were to ‘rehabilitate the status’ of the Health and 
Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (UK) for many industrial deaths by emphasising that its breach is 
truly ‘criminal’, as work health and safety law is in fact criminal law. The Australian National 
Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws was careful to emphasise that 
contraventions of the work health and safety statues, and in particular the general duty 
provisions, were, and should be, ‘criminal’. It noted that 
‘Providing for a breach of a duty of care to be a criminal offence is an essential element of modern 
OHS legislation, and is consistent with the graduated approach to securing compliance with the 
laws. Broadly put, it reflects the community’s view that any person who has a work-related duty of 
care but does not observe it should be liable to a sanction for placing another person’s health and 
safety at risk. Such an approach is also in line with international norms... Making non-compliance 
with a duty of care a criminal offence not only reflects the seriousness with which such conduct is 
regarded, but also reinforces the provision’s deterrent effect.’31 
Addressing the suggestion from some quarters that work health and safety offences were ‘quasi 
criminal’, the National Review Panel said that:  
‘Our attention has been drawn to a risk that contraventions of OHS laws may be perceived as not 
being ‘real’ offences, even though there should be no doubt that they are precisely that.’ 
31 
Indeed, a key policy approach in Australia since the early 1980s has been to increase the 
maximum fines for work health and safety offences. This approach has been intensified over the 
past decade. 
Ratcheting up penalties for breach of existing duties 
 
At the end of the 1970s, the maximum fine in many of the Australian work health and safety 
statutes was in the region of A$2,000. During the wave of reforms influenced by the UK Robens 
Report and the UK Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, the maximum fines were increased 
markedly in some statutes – for example, the maximum fines for a corporation for breach of a 
general duty provision in the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic) was A$40,000, and 
$50,000 for four ‘serious offences’, which included failing to comply with a prohibition notice; 
obstructing, assaulting or intimidating an inspector; wilful repetition of an offence; and 
discrimination against employees or prospective employees who raised work health and safety 
issues or exercised functions under the Act. In 1990 the maximum fines for corporations for 
‘serious offences’ was increased to $A250,000, and from 1998 the maximum fine for 
corporations for indictable offences (including the general duty provisions) was increased to 
A$250,000 if prosecuted in the County Court. Then in 2005, when the 1985 Act was replaced by 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic), the maximum fine for corporations was 
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increased to A$1,020,780. The maximum penalties in each of the other Australian work health 
and safety statutes were also increased significantly. Thus by the end of 2011, the maximum fine 
for corporations in New South Wales was $550,000 ($825,000 for repeat offences); in Western 
Australia $500,000 ($625,000 for repeat offences); in South Australia A$300,000; in Tasmania 
A$150,000; in the Australian Capital Territory A$200,000  and in the Northern Territory 
A$550,000.  
 
High maximum penalties are, of course, of little point if the actual fines imposed by the courts 
are small, and if defendants can individualise and decontextualise offences as described earlier in 
this article. In recent times the Australian courts have developed a series of sentencing principles 
for work health and safety offences, some which go some way to addressing these two 
concerns.32 The key principles recently were summarised in a series of Federal Court decisions:33  
(i) the penalty must be such as to compel attention to occupational health and safety generally, to 
ensure that workers whilst at work will not be exposed to risks to their health and safety; 
(ii) it is a significant aggravating factor that the risk of injury was foreseeable even if the precise cause or 
circumstances of exposure to the risk were not foreseeable; 
(iii) the offence may be further aggravated if the risk of injury is not only foreseeable but actually 
foreseen and an adequate response to that risk is not taken by the employer; 
(iv) the gravity of the consequences of an accident does not of itself dictate the seriousness of the 
offence or the amount of penalty. However the occurrence of death or serious injury may manifest 
the degree of the seriousness of the relevant detriment to safety; 
(v) a systemic failure by an employer to appropriately address a known or foreseeable risk is likely to be 
viewed more seriously than a risk to which an employee was exposed because of a combination of 
inadvertence on the part of an employee and a momentary lapse of supervision; 
(vi) general deterrence and specific deterrence are particularly relevant factors in light of the objects and 
terms of the Act; 
(vii) employers are required to take all practicable precautions to ensure safety in the workplace. This 
implies constant vigilance. Employers must adopt an approach to safety which is proactive and not 
merely reactive. In view of the scope of those obligations, in most cases it will be necessary to have 
regard to the need to encourage a sufficient level of diligence by the employer in the future. This is 
particularly so where the employer conducts a large enterprise which involves inherent risks to safety; 
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(viii) regard should be had to the levels of maximum penalty set by the legislature as indicative of the 
seriousness of the breach under consideration;  
(xi) the neglect of simple, well-known precautions to deal with an evident and great risk of injury, take a 
matter towards the worst case category; 
(x) the objective seriousness of the offence, without more may call for the imposition of a very 
substantial penalty to vindicate the social and industrial policies of the legislation and its regime of 
penalties. 
While these principles clearly indicate that work health and safety offences are to be regarded as 
very serious, and that duty holders are required to take a systematic approach to eliminating and 
controlling work health and safety risks, the principles do not explicitly address the ‘isolation 
techniques’ discussed earlier in this chapter so that there is still ample opportunity for defence 
counsel to seek to individualise and decontextualize offences during the sentencing process. 
Principle (v), in fact, might encourage defendants to shift blame onto workers, and there is little 
to prevent defendants isolating the incident in the past. 
 Higher fines where there is mens rea and/or fatality or serious injury 
Another key development, particularly during the past decade, was the introduction in a number 
of the work health and safety statutes of provisions imposing higher maximum penalties where 
an incident resulted in death, serious injury or a serious risk of death or serious injury, and where 
there was an element of mental intention (mens rea). This approach seeks to reduce the extent to 
which health and safety offences are differentiated from ‘real’ crimes of violence, by linking the 
offence more directly with the violent outcome of the contravention, and by the element of mens 
rea, a distinctive aspect of ‘real’ crime. Increasing the fine where a fatality results is, of course, not 
a new policy response. The UK Factories Amendment Act 1844, the first Factory Act to regulate 
machinery safety, imposed maximum fines of £20 for breach of the Act; but increased this to 
£100 for breaches of the safety provisions that resulted in injury or death. This sort of provision, 
and the additional element of mens rea was largely absent from the Australian work health and 
safety statutes enacted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but has re-emerged in the past decade.  
Some of the statutes only provided for higher fines for contraventions resulting in injury or 
death. For example, from 2003 the Queensland Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 enacted a 
series of ‘tiered’ maximum penalties, escalating with the seriousness of the outcome of the 
contravention of a general duty provision. Thus, where a breach caused multiple deaths, the 
maximum penalty was A$750,000 for corporations and A$150,000 or three years imprisonment 
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for individuals; if the breach caused death or grievous bodily harm A$375,000 for corporations 
and A$75,000 or two years imprisonment for natural persons; if the breach caused bodily harm, 
A$281,250 for corporations and A$56,250 or one year’s imprisonment for natural persons; and 
otherwise, A$187,500 for corporations and A$37,500 for natural persons. 
Others made provision for higher fines where employers recklessly (or through gross negligence) 
exposed workers to serious risks. For example, section 32 of the Victorian Occupational Health 
and Safety Act 2004 created an offence of recklessly placing another person at a workplace in 
danger of serious harm, with a maximum penalty of A$1,020,780 for a corporation and 
A$204,156 or 5 years imprisonment for a natural person. From 2008, section 59 of the South 
Australian Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 created a new offence of recklessly 
acting in a manner that created a substantial risk of death or serious harm to another person in 
the workplace, with maximum penalties of A$1,200,000 for corporations or A$400,000 or 5 
years imprisonment for natural persons. Sections 30-34 of the Work Safety Act 2008 (ACT) 
created a series of offences for: contraventions of the general duty provisions which resulted in 
negligent exposure to substantial risk of serious harm; reckless exposure to substantial risk of 
serious harm; negligent exposure to serious harm; and reckless exposure to serious harm. 
The Western Australian Act included both approaches. From 2004, section 19A of the Western 
Australian Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 created new offences if an employer 
contravened the employer’s general duty in circumstances of gross negligence (maximum fine 
A$500,000 for a first offence by a corporation and A$625,000 for a subsequent offence; and for 
an individual 50 per cent of the corporation fine or two years imprisonment) or resulting in 
death or serious harm to an employee (maximum fine A$400, 000 for a first offence by a 
corporation and A$500,000 subsequent offence; and for an individual 50 per cent of the 
corporation fine).  
Finally, two statutes created offences where the key elements involved both mens rea and a fatality 
– in a sense provisions strongly resembling industrial manslaughter but in the work health and 
safety statute. The New South Wales Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 from 2005 
included section 32A which created an offence where a breach of a general duty provision 
caused the death of a person to whom a duty is owed and the duty holder was reckless as to 
danger of death or serious injury. The maximum penalty for this offence was A$1,650,000 for a 
corporation and A$165,000 or five years imprisonment for a natural person. Section 82 of the 
2007 Northern Territory Act created an offence of intentional breach causing death with a 
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maximum penalty for a corporation of A$1,375,000 and from A$27,500 to A$275,000 or 5 years 
imprisonment for a natural person. 
To date, these provisions appear to have been little used. This is not altogether surprising 
because prosecution rates, particularly in the larger jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria and 
Queensland) have been falling, particularly in the past few years, and prosecution rates have 
never been high in the other jurisdictions. A rare case was the prosecution under section 32 of 
the Victorian Act of Orbit Drilling Pty Ltd for an incident in 2006 when an untrained 21 year old 
was killed while driving a heavily loaded truck down a very steep slope. The truck had not been 
properly maintained, and the brakes were defective. The company admitted that it had engaged 
in reckless conduct that had placed an employee in danger of serious injury, and the company 
was fined A$750,000, which was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of 
Appeal.34 
  Non-pecuniary sanctions 
Another approach to boosting the sanctions available to courts hearing work health and safety 
prosecutions has been to empower courts with non-pecuniary penalties. The weaknesses of the 
fine in the context of corporate offending have been well documented.35 These include the fact 
that fines do not usually reflect ability to pay, and thus penalise smaller firms and have little 
impact on large firms; corporations can, at least in some instances, absorb the costs of the fine 
by passing these on to consumers, workers and/or shareholders; corporations can simply pay a 
fine without doing anything to improve health and safety; and the fact that it is 
counterproductive to fine public sector corporations. Consequently, from 2000 some of the 
Australian work health and safety statutes introduced new corporate sanctions aimed at 
addressing at least some of these weaknesses, and aiming at rehabilitation, restitution and 
shaming in addition to the traditional focus on deterrence. The most notable provisions were: 
 adverse publicity court orders: (New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory); 
 a court order that the offender participate in a work health and safety-related project 
(New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia); 
 an order requiring the defendant to take remedial measures (Commonwealth, New South 
Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory) or to undertake 
training (South Australia and the Northern Territory); and 
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 adjourning the case with/without conviction and requiring the defendant to give an 
undertaking not to re-offend within two years and to engage a consultant, develop 
systematic work health and safety management, to be monitored by a third party 
(Victoria and Western Australia). 
While it can be argued that these sanctions do address, at least in part, some of the criticisms of 
the fine, some argue that these non-pecuniary sanctions themselves signal that work health and 
safety offences are not ‘really criminal’, because they are not the sorts of sanctions that are used 
for serious criminals within the criminal justice system. Again, these non-pecuniary sanctions 
have not been used by the courts much.36 
The harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts: The current approach 
The approach outlined in the previous section – non-pecuniary penalties and high maximum 
pecuniary penalties for work health and safety offences, and additional offences where 
contraventions involve mens rea of some kind and/or place workers or others at high levels of 
risk – has now been institutionalised through the process of harmonising Australian work health 
and safety law. In 2010 the Workplace Relations Ministers Council finalised and adopted a 
Model Work Health and Safety Act, which to date has been enacted by the Commonwealth, 
New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and 
the Northern Territory. The recently enacted Work Health and Safety Acts now institutionalise 
an approach that seeks to assert the criminality of work health and safety offences by imposing 
high penalties for contravention, particularly where there is recklessness that exposes others to 
high risk; enables reckless individuals to be imprisoned; and enables courts to impose non-
pecuniary sanctions.  
Sections 30 to 33 of the Work Health and Safety Acts provide for a tiered penalty regime for 
contraventions of the general duties. A person commits a category 1 offence when the person 
breaches a general duty by engaging in conduct that exposes an individual to a risk of death or 
serious injury or illness; and the person is reckless as to that risk. The maximum penalty for a 
category 1 offence is A$3 million for a corporation; A$600,000 and/or 5 years imprisonment for 
an individual conducting a business or undertaking, or an officer of a person conducting a 
business or undertaking; and A$300,000 and/or 5 years imprisonment for an offence committed 
by any other individual. 
A person commits a category 2 offence where non-compliance with a general duty exposes an 
individual to a risk of death or serious injury or illness. The maximum penalty for a category 2 
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offence is A$1.5 million  for a corporation; $300,000 for an individual conducting a business or 
undertaking, or an officer of a person conducting a business or undertaking; and $150,000 for an 
offence committed by any other individual. 
All remaining breaches of the general duty provisions are category 3 offences, where the 
maximum penalties are A$500,000, A$100,000 and A$50,000 respectively.  
The court can also make orders for non-pecuniary penalties,37 which include: 
 Adverse publicity orders, where the offender is ordered to publicise - or notify a 
specified person (or class of persons) of - the offence, its consequences, the penalty 
imposed and any other related matter; 
 Restoration orders, which order the duty holder to take steps within duty holder’s power 
to remedy any matter caused by the commission of the offence; 
 Work health and safety project orders, which order the duty holder to undertake a stated 
project for the general improvement of work health and safety; 
 Release of the duty holder on giving a court-ordered WHS undertaking not to commit 
further offences, and to observe special conditions; 
 Injunctions to require an offender to cease contravening the Act; and 
 Training orders, for one or more workers to undertake a specified course of training. 
Conclusion 
In this article I have outlined the historical processes that have ‘decriminalised’ the Australian 
work health and safety statutes. I have argued that this decriminalisation is the result of the way 
in which work health and safety offences have been differentiated from ‘real’ crimes of violence 
in the mainstream criminal law; the reluctance of work health and safety inspectorates to 
prosecute work health and safety offences; and the relatively low penalties imposed by courts 
once health and safety issues are individualised and decontextualised when prosecutions are 
conducted.  
I have also documented the Australian public policy debate about industrial manslaughter, a 
debate that has had minimal legislative effect. Only Australia’s smallest jurisdiction, the 
Australian Capital Territory, in 2002 enacted provisions enabling corporations and senior offices 
to be prosecuted for work-related deaths of workers. In all other Australian jurisdictions 
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prosecutions for gross negligence manslaughter can be brought against corporations and senior 
officers, but they are very unlikely to succeed against any but the smallest of firms, for the 
reasons outlined earlier in the article. 
Instead, in the past decade most Australian governments have done three things to bolster the 
‘criminality’ of work health and safety offences: increase the maximum penalties; create new 
offences (with higher levels of penalty) for contraventions of the work health and safety statutes 
involving recklessness or gross negligence and/or resulting in death; and introducing non-
pecuniary sanctions. This policy response has now been institutionalised through the process of 
harmonising Australian work health and safety law in the newly enacted Work Health and Safety 
Acts in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. At best, however, these reforms have 
only partly addressed the factors leading to the perception that work health and safety offences 
are not ‘real’ crimes – the sanctions for contraventions are significant but the ideological baggage 
of the ambiguity and conventionalisation of work health and safety crime still hold sway. 
Ironically, however, the provisions of the Model Work Health and Safety Act contemplate that 
gross negligence manslaughter to be used for work-related fatalities. The original 
recommendation for the introduction of a category 1 offence specified that the offence should 
arise when ‘there was serious harm to any person (fatality or serious injury) to whom a duty is 
owed or a high risk of such harm; and the duty holder has been reckless or grossly negligent’.38 
This recommendation was modified by the Workplace Relations Minsters Council to ‘an offence 
of recklessly endangering a person to risk of death or serious injury at a workplace’39 – that is, as 
the description of the category 1 offence in the previous section shows, ‘gross negligence’ and a 
‘fatality’ were removed from the elements of the offence, because, so I understand, otherwise the 
offence would overlap with the key elements in the crime of gross negligence manslaughter. In 
other words, the Work Health and Safety Acts leave ‘space’ for the crime of industrial 
manslaughter prosecutions, but the debilitating weaknesses in the current law of manslaughter 
for corporations and for senior officers – outlined in this article – remain in place everywhere 
but in the Australian Capital Territory. 
It seems safe to say that the debate about gross negligence manslaughter is off the policy agenda 
– at least in the near future. The manslaughter debate is unlikely to resurface in the next five to 
ten years, largely because the political party prepared to consider reform of manslaughter law, the 
Australian Labor Party at state and territory level, has largely lost favour with the electorate. 
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Sadly, only an incident resulting in mass fatalities – similar to the Westray tragedy 20 years ago – 
is likely to revive the work-related manslaughter debate in Australia. 
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